She was chosen to represent the American people “during this important stage of Libya’s new democracy,” White House spokesman Jay Carney said today adding that she is a career foreign service officer “who has served admirably in diplomatic posts around the world.”

If confirmed, she would head the U.S. embassy in Tripoli, Libya, amid heightened tension and tighter security following the deaths of Stevens and four other Americans who were killed while visiting the U.S. consulate in Benghazi on the 11th anniversary of 9/11.

Read more | Obama Nominates New Ambassador to Libya

The Tea Theory of Relativity

For us, tea was a matter of utmost importance; it was the only pleasure we had. It was so important that one of us, arguing with a prison guard, stated that a prisoner would be willing to exchange a cup of tea for an equivalent amount of his own blood.

Of course, this was gross exaggeration.

Of course, this was a clear indication of how important tea was in our existence.

It may be more accurate to say, as has one of our poets, that the evening tea prevents depression. Yet in prison, tea was so mediocre that it may have had the opposite effect, even though it came in generous quantities (nor should it be understood from “evening tea” that there was a morning tea or a noon tea).

Whatever the case may be we would scheme to obtain the greatest quantity of it possible.

It was served with dinner.

At first, each one of us would extend his plastic cup, and the warden would pour a helping of hot tea according to his calculations and generosity. Later, they gave us larger containers for sharing.

It dawned on us that the collective portions were much less than all our individual portions put together. So we divided ourselves such that some cells would receive individual cups while others would receive collective shares. Then we would gather all the tea and distribute it amongst ourselves.

Eventually, an observant inmate noticed that the portion for two people was hardly more than that for one.

This observation triggered deep reflection, from which sprang a moderately complex, and very wise idea.

Our plan depended on psychological suggestibility. It assumed that if a person requested a single cup of tea, and the next person requested tea for two, the difference between the two amounts would be minute. Therefore, the warden must be made to sense the magnitude of the difference from one portion to the next. For example, one person might ask for an individual portion, and the next, enough for four. In theory, this should lead to a second portion large enough for five or six people.

We debated the theory exhaustively. After countering all objections, I received collective approval.

We agreed among the different cells to request portions of tea in the following magnitude and order: 1-4-1-1-5 (or something to that effect).

After consolidating portions that evening, our yield was less than the average of the previous days.

With that we buried the tea theory of relativity though I do not believe it was allowed a fair scientific evaluation given the number of trials.

The “tribal thesis,” for example, is often invoked to explain Libyan politics, and makes “great hunting ground for the opportunist expert. Learn the names of a few tribes and where Gaddafi is from and you’re good for a three-minute talking head slot on most of the major news channels” (West 2011: 289). West’s sardonic comment here proves applicable to Libyan history on a general level. Of the controversies surrounding the 2011 Libyan revolution, perhaps the most tragic is the hijacking of Libya – not by Qatar, in a shady alliance with Mossad; neo-liberals; the United States; but rather, by ideologues with little to no background on the country. Gaddafi’s intentional isolation of the nation for such an extended period of time has in many ways, in the aftermath of the revolution, created an intellectual black hole: any conspiracy theorist or regional theorist seems entitled to project onto the country a host of preconceived notions neatly tailored to his or her ideological outlook. It is not a question of Libya, but a question about Libya: a key and critical difference. Consequently, this is not a book review about books, but a discussion about the broader trend they represent.

An academic colleague recently asked me to compile a bibliography on the Libyan revolution. He sought, however, theoretical assessments of the conflict that have yet to be produced— owing, again, to the pre-revolution difficulty of obtaining in-depth knowledge of Libyan history and internal politics. Extant texts on the Libyan revolution run the spectrum from the accounts of parachute journalists, relying heavily on sensationalist, or the rare, well-researched and straightforward accounts of journalists with in-depth experience of the country on the ground. I discuss here two publications typical of the divergent and predominant “thought” on the Libyan revolution—selected specifically for the manners in which respective authors assume ideologically-opposed frames of reference, but nonetheless mirror one another in superficial assumptions. Vijay Prashad’s Arab Spring, Libyan Winter and Bernard Henri-Levy’s La Guerre Sans l’Aimer are useful texts- not for what they reveal about the Libyan conflict itself – but rather, as a symbol of the role which the Libyan Revolution has come to play in public political discourse. In neither case does the reader obtain an understanding of realities on the ground, local opinions, or the emotions of a people in struggle—never a question of Libya but about Libya.

Vijay Prashad has amassed a wealth of support among leftist intellectuals, due in no small part to copious publications on subaltern studies, the failures of capitalism and global imperialism. Although Prashad is a respected voice on South Asia, his publications on the Arab Spring – and Libya, more specifically—begin to appear in Counterpunch, a website that defines itself as “muckraking with a radical attitude.” Counterpunch’s other Libya “experts” have included Franklin Lamb, whose curriculum vitae cannot seem to be found – anywhere. A stroll through Prashad’s credentials is instructive, and perfectly in keeping with Arab Spring, Libyan Winter. The text opens with an assessment of the Arab Uprisings, in which Prashad lauds the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions against a background of dire predictions for the future of post-Gaddafi Libya. Leaving aside the fact that the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes lost figureheads, but managed to retain the structural underpinnings of their former autocracies, Prashad’s declarations seem a bit hasty, to say the least. Yet it is with his revelations on the plans of the “Atlantic Powers” and the “Arab NATO” that the true thesis of the text emerges.

The initial section of Arab Spring, Libyan Winter is heavily weighted towards a discussion of Egyptian history, and a cursory examination of other, regional uprisings in Yemen, Bahrain, and the winds of discontent in Syria. In Prashad’s view, the supposed authenticity of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions derives from the popular nature of mass uprisings, a claim which belies his fundamental ignorance of North African nations’ political dynamics. As the dust from Ben Ali and Mubarak departures settles, Tunisia and Egypt much more closely resemble military coups than “revolution,”  properly-speaking (one need only look to the current discontent simmering across Egypt). Libya, however, according to Prashad, started out with the best of intentions, yet was taken over by expatriate neo-liberal Libyans colluding with the shadowy forces of imperialism. I’ve written elsewhere about the high cost paid by expatriate Libyans, and won’t belabor the point here; nonetheless, Prashad’s dismissive comments on the nature of the opposition to Gaddafi constitute a recurrent theme throughout the text, and reveal a superficial knowledge of Gaddafi-era Libya—including the neo-imperialist machinations undertaken by the heir-apparent Saif al-Islam.

Prashad focuses on Libya after ninety pages of “Arab Spring” background. Although his thesis that the United States and the Gulf Powers colluded to crush the Bahrain uprising is certainly valid, his discussion of Libya is riddled with inaccuracies and distortions. The author paints Saudi Arabia as desperate to suppress Bahraini opposition, and joyful about the distractions provided by Libya and Syria (89). He then begins to describe the uprising in Libya, which, according to Prashad, broke out in March (90). Be it a faulty fact-checker or a real lack of knowledge, the inaccurate chronology seriously jeopardizes the thesis’ fundamental credibility. Libya rose up on February 15, two days in advance of the planned Day of Rage on February 17. Syria, however, was slower to erupt: not until did the arrest of a group of young boys for spraying anti-Assad graffiti prompt demonstrations to spread and regime crackdowns—in mid-March, a mere few days before the United Nations resolution on the Libyan intervention.
Moreover, Prashad appears to lack an understanding of the basic structures and dynamics of Gaddafi’s Libya–quite understandable, given the regime’s self-conscious isolation. The author portrays not only “tribal Libya,” but what he calls the ultimate weak-point of Gaddafi and company’s strategy: underestimating the “ultimate tribe of the regime, the army (112).” This provides another fundamental inaccuracy in Prashad’s account: Gaddafi’s Libya lacked a traditional military structure; hence, the difficulty with integrating various militias we continue to witness. Rather, the paranoid “Brother Leader” created a splintered military structure with various, unconnected brigades—in order to prevent an army coup.

In short, Prashad’s assessment of Libya is riddled with inaccuracies that betray not only a lack of in-depth knowledge concerning the country under Gaddafi (and before) but also betray ideological convictions all too easily projected onto the intellectual void, the blank space of an
unknown nation. On the opposite side of the political spectrum, we find Bernard Henri-Levy, the supposedly expired-type known as a “public intellectual.” Levy’s La Guerre sans l’aimer: Journal d’un écrivain au cœur du printemps libyen (2011) constitutes a steadfast argument in
favor of the international intervention –which, if we are to fully credit the author, he nearly entirely orchestrated. For all his self-congratulation, the French philosopher’s book is a journal recounting his “feelings” on the country—about which he admittedly knew nothing in advance. It is a text which makes no claims to predict Libya’s future, or to present an analytical assessment of the conflict. It provides, rather, the ramblings of a self-important writer, evidenced in the documentary format as well: Levy has even produced and starred in a documentary – not about Libya, of course, but about his role in the uprising. La Guerre sans l’aimer spans the course of the entire revolution, yet remains self-consciously recounted through the eyes of the author. Levy recounts and ruminates on his condescension towards the Libyan people, depicting members the Transitional National Council as meek and seemingly awestruck by the philosopher’s presence. The reader follows Levy as marches down the Benghazi
Corniche, directing rebels to remove anti-Israeli graffiti and gives lectures on women’s emancipation to gathered crowds. Insufferable and paternalist, decidedly—at least he’s honest.

From one side, it’s Levy’s insufferable harangues about the compatibility of religion and democracy and the fear of political Islam, and from the other, Prashad’s deconstruction of insidious “Atlantic Powers” and dark “Arab NATO,” with shadowy puppet masters yanking international strings. Because Libya was ignored by the outside for so long –much of this originating in Gaddafi’s own isolationist policies—it is a convenient and simple slate on which to project imperialist (and anti-imperialist) fantasies : by thinkers both left and right. A sad truth about Libya under Gaddafi: one had to care. Those who did not had plenty of company—not many on the international scene and in the academy did. Did Libyans live through a stunningly brutal historical legacy—from Italian fascist occupation, corruption under the Idrissid monarchy, the false-promises of Gaddafi’s 1969 coup and his slide into full-throttle despotism, and so much more—only to see a courageous uprising hijacked? The leftist discourse of Prashad is no less paternalistic than the condescending democratization rhetoric it supposedly seeks to combat. You see, Libyans, it doesn’t matter that the vast majority of citizens take pride in the February 17th Revolution, and the electoral process. Nor does it matter that your population, in an unprecedented move, begged for the imposition of a No-Fly Zone—particularly from the eastern region where Benghazi is located (and where the memory of Italian concentration camps and earlier “Western help” still looms large).

Ideologues with superficial historical knowledge and faulty sense of time forget that Libya has only been free from Italian fascist colonial occupation for barely sixty years; Gaddafi’s reign is not yet even three years behind us. Let us be clear: the aftermath of revolution is brutal; it
is ugly. It is complicated. But one thing Prashad and Levy demonstrate. For intellectuals of all stripes, “’We’ in the ‘West’ still claim to know best.” Sadly, when it comes to Libya—most of usknow nothing at all.

Amanda E. Rogers is a PhD candidate and Arabic lecturer at Emory University. She can be
found on Twitter under @MsEntropy.  This review was initially written in July 2012. It was rejected for publication elsewhere on the grounds that the authors’ review proved too inflammatory. In the interest of open dialogue and free exchange of ideas, she thanks Kifah for a forum to publish this opinion piece.

This is the first of a series of articles that will tackle psychosocial issues of war in Libya, the goal being to brainstorm and extend an invitation for all of us to grieve and heal together.

The need to understand the mental health impact of war has never been greater in Libya than now. The country has been through a full-fledged war to achieve its liberation in 2011, which came at a heavy psychological price. The war lasted nearly one year ending with thousands of people dead and hundreds of thousands injured and displaced.

The mental toll on the Libyan people has become overwhelming, complicated by the lack of standard mental healthcare in the country, as well as the cultural stigma to accessing the sparse mental health services.

I start with an urgently needed initiative for Libya. As it stands, Libyans have ended up fighting and killing other Libyans. When Gaddafi promised a long and exhausting war even after his death, he meant a psychological war through spreading hate, anger and revenge. He ordered the use of ugly weapons of torture, humiliation and rape in order to destroy the Libyan psyche and the beautiful social fabric of the country.

Ignoring the crimes and human rights violations committed on both sides of the conflict can have serious repercussions, and the stakes are high: if we do not deal with these issues quickly and openly, Libya could be headed towards a period of trans-generational hatred and resentment. People who are walking wounded, bleeding psychologically, forced to be displaced or sidelined and discriminated against might decide to have another “revolution” in a number of years or decades, a heavy price that Libya cannot afford to pay.

This is a comprehensive psychosocial recovery project made up of eight very diverse but complementary initiatives that will run simultaneously. I have submitted this proposal to every government post-liberation, and it is my hope that it gets some attention.

• The first initiative addresses the mental health needs of the community in a culturally appropriate way. The psychosocial impact on war survivors will be assessed and attended to.
• Second is the implementation of problem-solving workshops to allow communities to participate in ongoing dialogues for the purpose of resolving specific concerns. Healing and peace cannot be achieved in Libya unless people from all sides of the conflict sit together and explore the meanings and means of justice, forgiveness and reconciliation.
• The third involves training local community members in conflict resolution methods. Libyans need to master alternative, non-violent ways to resolve conflicts.
• Fourth is the use of media to reach a wider audience for the purpose of counteracting common misconception and sources of misinformation. A well-balanced media can limit rumors and share unspoken stories of the human spirit.
• Fifth is the creation of peace commissions and committees to allow community members to discuss potential ways of establishing peace. The vital question of “justice comes first or forgiveness” needed to be publically voiced out and discussed.
• The sixth is one in which indigenous forms of conflict resolution and healing are supported as an accepted way of working towards reconciliation. Tribal leaders, Imams and “traditional healers” can play a vital role in this very critical time of Libya’s history.
• Seventh is the fostering of community activities that promote collaboration between “enemies.” This will likely start with play and art activities for children and women. The Grant-a-Wish model can be used here.
• Lastly are initiatives that promote democracy and human rights.

There is hope, and plenty of it: the human spirit is resilient and Libyans have proven to have what it takes to recover from their painful recent past, heal the invisible wounds of trauma and rebuild their country. If things continue going in the right direction, Libya might indeed become a role model in every standard including mental health care.  That however requires the perseverance and hard work of many good people who care deeply about their country.

(Adapted from the Arabic, Imed ud-Din Hamaam for Al-Arabiya News)

“It is not by bread alone that man lives”–or at least, not the kind of life that Salah Hasan, an entrepreneur in the Libyan capital of Tripoli, wants for his people. Initiatives such as Hasan’s “Cup of Culture” in Safwa Coffee café, are part of a wave of cultural cafés that have slowly begun to spread down the city streets. These Cafe owners are not satisfied with offering only coffee and tea; they’d rather follow up with serving a “cup of culture” and soft, ambient music.

Hasan says “the project is primarily centered around culture, and aims to change the interets and convictions of [Libya's] youth…What we’re focusing on is intellectual change.”

The starting point of this change is a simple rack set up in a corner of the shop — on it, there are books, papers, and magazines of varying genres and subject matter. Anyone who visits the café is free to help themselves to any of the growing material; an accessible and already popular stand-in for a local library.

Here, you will not have just a cup of coffee. Rather, you can relish in a “cup of culture,” as the owners of this coffee shop like to say. In Safwa Coffee, shown in the video above,  the phrase is imprinted on the rack displaying the reading material available to visiting patrons.

The initiative has enjoyed a popular reception, and it’s clear that the idea resonates with people; the cafe has attracted groups who’ve embarked upon scouting for books to contribute.

The driving forces of the project say that it is an invitation to the Libyan youth to invest their free time in more edifying activities. They want to move away from traditional methods of learning by introducing alternative, modern systems to attract and encourage young people to hang out in coffee shops–a non-academic setting to foster a life-long interest in learning.

1. Strengthen the positions of elected local councils and involve them in the government. Regional sensitivities have not healed yet, and each city seems to be in steady competition with another in voicing grievances of neglect and under-appreciation. The Prime Minister has plenty to deal with and strengthening local councils could help get a lot of smaller issues off of his hands, perhaps into even better ones. Local councils need to be allowed to make their own decisions in certain fields without the consultation of the government.  The Libyan people want and need an end to bureaucracy, and in order to be efficient a local council cannot wait for confirmation from Tripoli to arrive before it can carry out action in a certain field. There would naturally have to be an accountability system that the council would be held to for their actions, but they can only be taken to task for their actions if they’re first given the chance to perform them. Local councils must be made up of dedicated Libyans who could then progress organically through civil positions and eventually be eligible to run for a seat in the parliament.
2. Have a set plan of action and take initiative in addressing the grievances of the Libyan people, rather than reacting sloppily to expressions of discontent with too-late press conferences and impassive promises. The previous government has been very slow when it comes to taking action. As we have seen the previous government has been, as a certain politician put it “a fire truck at work,” getting involved in the public sphere only when things go up in flames. The Prime Minister must have a clear list of specific rather than general issues and must start setting quick and agile strategies to delegate and tackle these issues as fast as possible rather than waiting for them to escalate.
3. Security, Security, Security. With all the weapons on the street and in every household problems are just waiting to happen. Perhaps the government could criminalize unlicensed weapons or come up with innovative ways to have citizens hand in their weapons (tip: “innovative” does not mean trading in weapons for cash prizes.) Most of the men holding weapons are jobless and have sacrificed so much for the freedom of this nation. The government needs to provide viable and sustainable career opportunities for these young men if they are to expect any degree of cooperation in weapon returns. Unfortunately, the government’s slow, reactionary attitude has served only to reinforce the idea that violence and uproar are the most productive means to change. People need to be reassured that their efforts have not been hijacked before they will consider relinquishing the weapons that have proven to be their best assets.
4. Be as transparent as possible. The government would do well to consider having weekly briefings on what has been accomplished in each ministry, as well as inform the people of the obstacles the government might be facing. Not only would this give the public a sense of what sorts of progress they can expect in reasonable time frames,  but it could also serve to unify and empower people who would be capable of alleviating some of these obstacles, if anyone had cared to ask. While the current attempts at social media integration have been novel and exciting, accessibility is not the same as transparency. Keeping people informed eases up the operations of the government and also people would want to help out ease these obstacles for the government in order to see Libya advance.
5. Be a man of the people. The Prime Minister must come down to the streets whenever the opportunity to do so is available. The people want a Prime Minister who feels their pain and struggle, a person who can come down to the street assure them everything is OK and then prove it. The PM must remember that visiting a large protest that is calling for a certain cause, would have positive implications not only in hearing out the problems these people may face, but also these protesters would feel as if the government cares and the PM himself cares and will personally see to that their demands are considered in the cabinet meetings and delegated quickly to the corresponding ministry.
6. Honesty: The Prime Minister and his cabinet must be honest with the people. If a mistake is committed then step up and claim responsibility and face the consequences. Own up to your mistakes. Be blunt. Earn the respect of the people. People respect those who take responsibility for their mistakes and work quickly to fix them.
7. A team is as strong as its weakest link. The Prime Minister must not hold on to weak and incompetent ministers who are failing at their jobs; now is not the time for sheepish formalities. If a minister is repeatedly failing at his/her mission then fire them. We have witnessed this with a particular ministry whose minister was dragged along not only pulling back the progress of the government but the entire nation.  Ministers who oppose you and bring forth debatable reasons are ministers who care about their country and add much-needed dimension to the governing body.
8. Involve civil society. The Prime Minister must be a man who is willing to work with the civil society accepting their ideas and working upon them. The Prime Minister must have regular or monthly meetings with successful LIBYAN NGOs and other organizations in order to show the appreciation and support of the government towards these people who have devoted their time and effort to helping ease the problems many cities face such as housing of refugees, providing food items to those in need, and providing school bags to children who cannot afford to buy their own. The government must sit down with these organizations and discuss issues and obstacles these organizations may be facing as well as offer financial support for their projects.
9. Fear Allah more than you fear failure and judicial actions against any mistakes you may commit. A Prime Minister who fears Allah and knows that Allah is watching him in every move and decision as a Prime Minister. Not only will this earn him the respect of the Libyan people but also the respect of the international community as well. The Libyan people are an “Ammanah” (Responsibility) upon you, and you shall be held accountable in front of Allah on the Day of Judgment. Seek fulfillment rather than power.
10. Remember our martyrs every day. The Prime Minister needs to remember the struggle Libyans have been living for the past 42 years and think of the mothers who have had their sons taken from them and think about how it would feel to walk into his martyr sons room and go through his clothes and the pain many Libyan families—especially the mothers—go through every single day. The Prime Minister must remember the blood that has been shed and tears that have dropped down the cheeks of every mother  and make sure that his number one goal is that the Libyan people will never see another dark day be it another dictator or the killing of another soul.

A simple division of the total fuel subsidies by the number of passenger cars produces seven gas tanks per month per passenger car; flour subsidies give each family 37 loaves of bread a day. The study applies the same approach for all commodities, concluding that it is economically inefficient for the government to provide these subsidies.

Bey — who commissioned the study — is the chairman of HB Group, a large importer and distributor of most consumer products in Libya. The HB Group has a substantial market share, which grants the group what some may consider an unfair leverage on the retail channel, in a country where anti-competitive regulation practically does not exist.

Bey’s study does miss the obvious, however; for example, the increase of fuel costs to the 480 distribution vehicles fleet of HB Group will clearly eat into the margins of their distribution operation. HB group will have to pass the additional cost to consumers in the form of higher prices. This scenario will occur at all points of the value chain leading to hyperinflation. Another example: a family that does not own a car will likely use the minibus to get to school and work. Removing the fuel subsidies will dispropotionately affect these families, increasing their transportation costs far than families who own a car; a great deal more when one considers the average size of a family is just shy of 6 members. Libya currently lacks the kind of sophisticated public transport system that needs to be put in place before fuel subsidies can be eliminated.

Bey’s study identifies a method for removing subsidies that is simple and neat, but problematic. In addressing a complex problem Bey’s solution is to calculate the value of the subsidies per person and hand it to them in the form of monthly cash handouts and stop the subsidies. The real question is: why propose monthly handouts? The short answer could be that Bey & Co may be able to take advantage of additional sudden unconstrained and undirected purchasing power of the Libyan consumer.

The study ignored the effects on the private sector, a sector that Mr. Bey always claims to champion and represent. Companies in multiple industries have based the price of their products and services on the cost of subsidized goods. Many have signed government contracts with a price that factors in a cost of subsidies energy; removing this subsidy without renegotiating contracts will have the effect of a perfect storm on the Libyan private sector.

Mr. Bey has launched a lobbying campaign against subsidies, using the study as his launching pad. It is acceptable to lobby for reform in Libyan economic policy when it is aligned with self-interest, but with civil society Institutions that are practically non-existent, grave danger lies in this type of short sightedness. A solution designed to support Libya’s oligarchs at the expense of all other Libyans is not the right solution.

Anti-competitive practices are unregulated, and oligarchs who already control a large share of many Libyan markets will be able to grow an even larger share, locking others out of the market if purchasing power is shifted quickly from subsidies to additional freely spendable cash income.

Entrepreneurs who are competing with the oligarchs dominating many industries should not be preempted. Young and new entrepreneurs and small businesses need to be given a chance grow their business in fair competition with the oligarchs  who in turn should not be in a position to effectively stop new businesses which may compete with them from emerging.

Last month the state of Illinois, which currently provides subsidies to residential customers with electric space heat, proposed an order to establish a process to remove these subsidies, the process would adopt a cap approach under which there would be a limit of 10% on the total annual bill increase for residential customers. The process will last 4 years and the full value of the subsidies is less than $70 Million.

If a state in a country that champions free markets proposed a process that takes 4 years to remove just $70 Million worth of subsidies, we clearly need to put in more thought and a developed process to remove a whopping $11 Billion’s worth. Removal of subsidies must be a gradual, carefully planned process. This process should include improvement in average income and social welfare programs. The process should also include enforceable market regulation to protect the consumer from anti-competitive practices. Most importantly it should guarantee that those dependent on the subsidies do not fall through the cracks.

في الوقت الذي يُعيد فيه شعب ليبيا بناء مجتمعهم وبنيته التحتية وإقتصاده بعد المعارك في 2011 التي أدت إلى في آخر المطاف إلى الإطاحة بنظام القذافي، فإنهم يواصلون سعيهم للحصول على إتصال بالإنترنت مستقر وعال السرعة. الدخول إلى الشبكة هو أساسي للإتصال في بلد حر لكل من الإتصالات الفردية والتجارية. و وفقاً لمركز بروتوكل الإنترنت العربي فإنه قبل الإنتفاضة ضد القذافي مارست الحكومة الليبية سيطرة محكمة على تدفق حركة الإنترنت و راقبت الإتصالات الإلكترونية و وضعت قيوداً  على الوصول إلى المعلومات. وخلال الثورة ظهرت هشاشة وجود مُقدّم وحيد لخدمة الإنترنت عندما فصلت الحكومة الإنترنت ومنعتها عن الشعب الليبي.

وتجتهد حالياً عدة مناطق في ليبيا في إعادة بناء البنية التحتية للإتصالات حيث أنها تعرضت لضرر كببر خلال الأزمة وخاصة في مصراتة وبنغازي حيث جرت المعارك الرئيسية. إن تاريخ الرقابة على الإنترنت والبنية التحتية المعاقة يساهمان في وجود أبطأ إنترنت في العالم., وتعني سرعة الإنترنت التي تقل عن 256 كيلوبت أن تصبح العديد من تطبيقات الشبكة لا نفع منها ما يسبب قيوداً كيبرة على إستخدام الشبكة للأعمال والأفراد. وتُعتبر ليبيا في تقرير أكاماي عن حالة الإنترنت لسنة 2011 صاحبة أبطأ سرعة إنترنت في العالم، كما تناقصت فعلياً سرعات الإنترنت في ليبيا بينما أظهرت بقية البلدان ، بإستثناء فيتنام، تحسناً.

إن وجود شبكة إنترنت مستقرة وذات سرعة عالية في إلإقتصاد الحالي الدولي الذي تدفعه التقنية هو أمر اساسي للأعمال والصناعة والتجارة. وتعتمد التجارة العالمية إعتماداً كيبراً على الإنترنت للمبيعات وإدارة سلسلة الإمداد والتعاملات المالية وتسليم المنتجات.

وبينما دفع إنتاج النفط من ناحية تاريخية الإقتصاد الليبي فإن البلاد ستحتاج لتنويع إقتصادها لإتاحة فرص العمل للسكان ما سيعزز الإستقرار أثناء إنتقال ليبيا من عقود الحكم الإستبدادي. ومن المشكوك فيه إلى حد بعيد ما إذا كانت ليبيا للإتصالات والتقنية التي كانت تملكها الدولة ، وهي الشركة الوحيدة المُقدّمة لخدمة الإنترنت،  قادرة على تقديم إتصال إنترنت عالية السرعة تحتاجها الأعمال والأفراد للإنتقال بنجاح إلى إقتصاد السوق العالمي ومجموعة الأمم الحرة.

تاريخ وأداء ليبيا للإتصالات والتقنية

شرعت ليبيا للإتصالات والتقنية ، التي أسسها محمد القذافي، في العمل لجلب خدمات الإنترنت والإتصالات إلى ليبيا سنة 1997 وأصبحت أول مُقدّم لخدمة الإنترنت في ليبيا. وقد أدخلت تقنية واي ماكس في سنة 2009 وهي الخدمة اللاسلكية ذات الحزمة العريضة. وعلى الرغم من إتاحة الإنترنت ذات الحزمة العريضة كانت مرتبة سرعات الإنترنت في ليبيا في المدى الضيق الحزمة.

وقد أسهمت مراقبة حركة الإنترنت قبل سقوط نظام القذافي بالإضافة إلى الخدمة الرديئة التي تقدمها ليبيا للإتصالات والتقنية في المستوى المتدني لتغلغل الإنترنت. 5.5 بالمئة فقط من الشعب الليبي لديهم إتصال بالإنترنت وهذ النسبة هي الأدنى في الشرق الأوسط وأفريقيا. إن إستياء الشعب الليبي من خدمات ليبيا للإتصالات والتقنية واضح في صفحة موقع فيس بوك “أكره ليبيا للإتصالات والتقنية” التي يؤيدها 13,258شخصاً والملاحظات العديدة التي تشكو من الخدمة. وهناك ميزة ملحوظة في هذه الصفحة وهي كافة الصور التي أرسلها مستخدمي ليبيا للإتصالات والتقنية كدليل على سرعة الإنترنت البطيئة. وهناك مشكلة أخرى في خدمة الإنترنت التي تقدمها ليبيا للإتصالات والتقنية وهي أنها مقصورة على مراكز السكان الرئيسية على الساحل.

وقد أظهرت إنتفاضة الشعب الليبي ضد القذافي المشكلة في بلد يعتمد على شركة تملكها الحكومة وتعمل كمزود أساسي لخدمة الإنترنت. وفي بداية مارس 2011 حُجبت خدمة الإنترنت في ليبيا لمدة ستة أشهر. وبينما كانت هناك أوقات أمكن فيها دخول الإنترنت فإن حجبها لم يمنع فقط الإتصال بين المعارضة والناشطين بل منع أيضاً الأعمال الصغيرة التي إعتمدت على الإنترنت لتسيير تعاملاتها التجارية.

وقد ضاعف هذا من تضرر الإقتصاد الذي عانت منه ليبيا بسبب العمليات العسكرية. وقد عزا الخبراء التواجد المتقطع للإنترنت للخلاف بين موظفي ليبيا لإتصالات والتقنية الذين ساندواالقذافي وأولئك الذين ساندوا المعارضة.

الحاجة لمقدم خدمة إنترنت آخر مُرخّص

في الوقت الذي وظفت فيه ليبيا للإتصالات والتقنية سعد كاشير ، وهو مدري لتقنية المعلومات عمل لدى مايكروسوفت و إن سي آر ، ميراً  تنفيذياً جديداً لها  إستمرت الشركة تحت سيطرة وزارة الإتصالات والمعلوماتية. وقد دعمت تقارير حديثة من ليبيا تقاريراً بأن الوزارة تسيطر على النقابات والعاملين في ليبيا للإتصالات والتقينة ما يعيق محاولات تحديث الخدمات لتلبية إحتياجات الشعب الليبي. وقد أغلق إضراب حدث مؤخراً خدمة الإنترنت ليوم واحد ما أدى إلى خسارة ليبيا للإتصالات والتقينة المزيد من ثقة الجمهور.

تحتاج ليبيا إلى مقدم خدمة إنترنت آخر مرخص للتنافس مع ليبيا للإتصالات والتقنية في تقديم خدمات الإنترنت في البلاد. غير أنه ليس هناك إطار سياسي لترخيص مقدم خدمة إنترنت آخر. وقد أوحت مؤخراً حملة تويتر وفيس بوك إسمها “الإنترنت قادمة” بوجود شركة إنترنت جديدة تحاول الدخول إلى السوق الليبي. وإذا صح هذا فإنه سيكون ذا نفع كبير للشعب الليبي حين أن شركة إنترنت أخرى يمكنها أن تُسرّع في تصليح البنية التحتية المتضررة التي تعيق عمل إنترنت مستقرة وأن تكسر إحتكار ليبيا للإتصالات والتقنية لخدمة الإنترنت في ليبيا. كما أن شركة إنترنت لا تملكها الدولة من المحتمل أن تركز أكثر على تقديم خدمات عالية الجودة ومستقرة للزبائن بعكس خدمة إحتياجات حكومة لا تزال في مرحلة إنتقالية. ونظراً لمحدودية تغطية المناطق بخدمة الإنترنت التي تقدمها ليبيا للإتصالات والتقنية فإن شركة إنترنت جديدة يمكنها أن تستفيد من سوق بدون خدمة في المناطق النائية في ليبيا.

Libya’s gun control problem has lead to continued violence in the region and the NTC’s attempts at weapons collections have proved futile.

ALSO READ: Libya’s escalating gun problem [AL JAZEERA ENGLISH]

On the responsibility to write:

❝ There is a distinction between the citizen and the artist that I have always felt. When I sit and write an article, as a citizen the experience of writing is very different from when I sit and write a novel. Even the way I sit, the way I feel as myself, you know, feels different. And this experience –this very extreme experience—of the revolution and the overwhelming invitations that are put to you as a citizen to get involved has clarified this distinction for me even more. So I feel, yes, as a citizen, I feel obliged to be an active citizen, to speak truth to power, call injustice by its name. But the artist continues to feel no obligation towards these things at all. The obligation I feel as an artist is solely to the work. “

On Gaddafi’s death:

❝ ”I think the way that he was killed was morally wrong. But it also was a missed opportunity for the future of the country. It overcomplicates things to do with accountability, with the relationship of justice to revenge, all of those things. Its very difficult territory to navigate…[but also] there was something being played out there in the violent way that he was treated that seemed to say something about the past too. It was a moment of psychosis that expressed something about the horror but also the sense of impotence that I think people felt towards life.”

Listen to the full 15-minute interview here.